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Abstract 
This paper examines the complexity and "fuzzy logic" actually at play in 
governance in case studies such as HIH (Australia) and Enron (USA). 
The rules applying to each sector cannot fully explain events. 
Non-prescribed factors influencing behaviours affecting the 
interconnections, interdependencies and interactions of the individuals 
and institutions concerned often determine outcomes.  
 
Socio-political systems are dynamic complex evolving systems that 
function according to bounded self-organisation. Their governance often 
involves decision-making behaviour that does not operate according to 
formulaic rules but is analogous to the fuzzy logic according to which 
certain systems behave. 
 
Viewing the relationship between public management as regulators, 
corporations and others as complex dynamic relationships assists 
understanding the role of unanticipated events and the management of 
responses and adaptation to uncertainty in a society’s internal and 
external environments. This can facilitate the protection and advancement 
of the public interest by public management. 
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1.  Introduction 
Our theoretical explanations of the public management of the corporate 
regulatory environment often fail to recognise the complexity and 
indeterminacy of the public-corporate relationship. This relationship 
forms an important element of socio-political governance. It is used in 
this paper to explore features of governance, reviewing the nature of this 
relationship in recent cases such as the regulations applicable to HIH 
Insurance and Enron Corporation.  
 
“Corporations” and “corporate” here relates to entities that are legally 
incorporated and carry on business in the market sector, most commonly 
owned by non-government sources of capital.  
 
Rather than treating the corporate environment as if it can be quantified 
and is rule driven, this paper analyses the nature and effects of this 
governance as complex evolving systems. Fuzzy logic
1 is used as a 
metaphor in the description of the complexity and indeterminacy of the 
relationships.  
 
Governance is an all-embracing process that incorporates the many 
components of society whose decisions and actions affect the lives of 
others, in Corkery’s terms, “a process by which the diverse elements in a 
society exercise authority which in turn influence policy and decisions 
affecting public life and economic and social development” (Corkery, 
1999). 
 
Society integrates three sectors (Boulding, 1970, Offe, 2000, Paquet, 
2001, Polanyi, 1957). These sectors are usually expressed as institutional 
demarcations, but similar demarcation of sectors of governance is 
possible: public governance, corporate governance and civil society. As 
subdivisions of a broad process, the processes that operate within and 
between these sectors are central to the manner in which socio-political 
governance functions overall. 
 
This paper presents findings suggesting that governance processes are 
inter-related in three ways. They are inter-connected, interdependent and 
interactive. These inter-relationships are such that the governance of any 
one sector can only be fully understood if its inter-relationships with the 
other sectors are taken into account. These relationships are found to be 
dynamic, and the socio-political system to be a dynamic complex 
evolving system (LSE, 2002) that functions according to bounded  
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self-organisation. Its governance often involves decision-making 
behaviour that does not operate according to formulaic rules but which is 
analogous to the behaviour of certain systems as described by fuzzy logic. 
2.  Public management of corporate regulation 
A remarkable aspect of the literature on the role of public management in 
the regulation of corporate environment is the paucity of material. A 
review of articles published in leading public administration and public 
management journals available online for the most recent 24-month 
periods reveals very few articles listed with titles suggesting any 
relevance to this important area of public management.  
 
Table 1. Public administration and public management journal articles related to regulation 
of corporations 
Journal ISSN  Issues 
per 
year 
Article(s) relevant to the regulation of 
corporations, published during last two 
years 
Australian Journal of 
Public Administration  
Print:  
0313-6647 
Online:        
1467-8500 
4  A Standard for Regulatory Compliance? 
Industry Self-regulation, the Courts and 
AS3806-1998  
Carroll P. and M. McGregor-Lowndes. 
December 2001, vol. 60 no. 4 pp. 80-91(12) 
Public Administration  Print: 
0033-3298 









4  Regulation or revenues? An analysis of local 
business licences, with a case study of the 
single business permit reform in Kenya 
Devas, Nick and Roy Kelly  










0033-3352 6  The Securities and Exchange Commission: A 
small regulatory agency with a gargantuan 
challenge  
Khademian, Anne M. Sep/Oct 2002; Vol. 62 
no.5 pp.515-526 (12) 
Public Management  0033-3611  12  Keeping up with telecom: convergence, 
broadband, and access.  








4  Management Of Telecommunications Service 
Provision: An Analysis Of The Tele Danmark 
Company 1990-8  
Greve, Carsten and Kim Viborg Andersen 
Vol. 3 no.1 pp.35-52 (18)  
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As Table 1 shows, very little research is being published in this area that 
is central to the functioning modern societies. During that same period, 
these journals list many articles related to various forms and aspects of 
privatisation. That is undoubtedly an important area of responsibility for 
public sector managers, but it does not diminish the need to investigate 
the management of policy affecting far larger sections of national 
economies. Major works on public management give little or no attention 
to the management of the legal and policy infrastructure within which 
corporations operate and on which they are often dependent for efficient 
functioning of the market and the reconciliation of corporate objectives 
with social goals (e.g. see (6 et al., 2000, Bearup, 2000, Brudney et al., 
2000, Hughes, 1998, Lane, 2000, Lawler et al., 1998, Minogue(ed), 1998, 
Miyakawa, 1999, Miyakawa(ed), 1999, Pierre and Peters, 2000, 
Wollmann and Schroter(eds.), 2000). There is a significant literature on 
the regulation of the labour market including industrial relations, which is 
one important element of the environment in which corporations operate 
e.g. Clark (2000).  
 
Corporations account for the overwhelming majority of economic activity 
in most societies. They are dependent on the existence and maintenance 
of a legal infrastructure providing fundamental features of the 
environment in which they operate. For example, without secure property 
title, corporations would lead a precarious existence. Indeed, the creation 
of a secure and efficient land title system is a major challenge facing 
many former communist nation-states. 
 
Similarly, contract law, banking services, share stock and securities 
exchanges and various other aspects of the environment that directly 
affect corporations profoundly impinge on their operations. These have 
implications not just for the corporations themselves but in turn affect the 
forms and levels of employment, the quality of life and the achievement 
of many goals with which we are concerned and which we seek to fulfil. 
 
Only the state has the exclusive legislative authority to provide this legal 
infrastructure. 
 
This paper is intended as one small step to an improved understanding of 
the role performed by the state, with particular reference to its constant 
inter-relationships with sectors. Corporate failures, such as of HIH 
Insurance group and Enron Corporation
2, are used to examine the 
operation of relationships between sectors, drawing on literature and 
findings in the fields of public management, philosophy, complexity and 
fuzzy logic. Such cases demonstrate complex dynamic relationships  
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between public managers of regulatory regimes, policy makers, 
professional standards setters, business leaders and corporations. “Enron” 
has become a shorthand for the issues of corporate governance affecting 
significant numbers of corporations that have been addressed in the USA 
since late 2001.  
3.  HIH 
HIH Insurance group was Australia’s largest corporate collapse when it 
failed in early 2001, several months before Enron. HIH was based in 
Sydney and was a dominant company in the Australian insurance 
industry. HIH also had major subsidiaries operating in the USA and UK. 
Losses by the subsidiaries were major factors in the collapse. The 
collapse was significant in two important ways. Investors lost the value of 
their investment and policy-holders were left without cover. In the case of 
people dependent on income from HIH policies and retirees dependent on 
HIH dividends, the effects were devastating. In addition, the entire 
Australian insurance industry was destabilised and certain categories of 
insurance cover became difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in the short 
term. 
 
The response to HIH’s collapse has been more protracted and extended 
over a much longer period than Enron. The responses have overlapped 
with other reforms, some arising from unrelated events and processes.  
 
The major procedural response was the appointment of the HIH Royal 
Commission. It was formally appointed on 29 August 2001
3 and reported 
on 4 April 2003 (HIH Royal Commission, 2003). The Report makes 
detailed findings indicating that the failure was overwhelmingly due to 
the incompetence and misconduct of directors and officers. 
 
As a corporation whose shares were traded on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX), HIH was bound by Australia’s continuous disclosure 
rules to advise ASX and thus investors of any event that might materially 
affect the value of its shares. It was similarly required by law to keep the 
Australian Securities and Exchange Commission (ASIC) informed. As an 
insurance company it was obliged to keep the Australia Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA) informed. HIH failed to fulfil these 
requirements, but neither ASIC nor APRA acted vigorously to pursue 
these failures, despite some warning signs.  
 
Thus, there was a combination of breaches of the law by HIH and 
ineffective performance by the regulators. The performance of APRA in  
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particular is ascribed directly to organisational reform from July 1998 
continuing until the HIH collapse and the relocation of APRA’s office 
from Canberra to Sydney. There were many resignations and a severe 
loss of corporate memory, exacerbated by the inevitable delays in 
recruiting and training staff.  
 
ASIC saw APRA as having responsibility for insurance industry 
regulation, which although not entirely parallel, imposed more stringent 
requirements than Corporations Law (HIH Royal Commission, 2003). 
Insurance cover 
The failure of the market for certain insurance products lead to a flurry of 
activity by governments within Australia. The complex interaction of 
constitutional powers over certain areas such as tort law, which resides 
with the Australian States, and effective national government control of 
corporations law and the regulation of financial institutions including the 
insurance industry, led to creative and innovation solutions. Initially, the 
States with larger populations acted rapidly to address the crisis in the 
availability of cover, particularly for public liability.  There was a serious 
risk of divergent legislation that would have added to the complexity and 
cost of operating in the relatively small national market.  
 
The danger was dealt with through the appointment by the national, state 
and territory ministers of the Honourable Justice Ipp to prepare the 
Review of the Law of Negligence. Ipp received 100 submissions from 
individuals, diverse organisations using insurance products, the legal 
profession and the insurance industry (Ipp, 2002). Consideration and 
adoption of the recommendations is continuing at the time of writing 
(Queensland Parliamentary Library, 2003, p4). 
 
There is no indication of HIH exerting or benefiting from political 
influence. 
 
During the conduct of the Royal Commission, the Enron collapse 
intervened and led to reviews in Australia as elsewhere. One was the 
“Review of Independent Auditing by Registered Company Auditors” by 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. A 
number of common issues arose. A total of 73 submissions were received 
from individuals and organisations, many of them professional 
associations and academic experts (Joint Comittee of Public Accounts 
and Audit, 2002). The Report was tabled in September 2002. 
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4.  Enron 
Enron Corporation was a major company based in the USA operating in 
the energy sector within the USA and in a number of other countries 
including a major investment in an electricity generating plant in the 
Indian state of Maharashtra. In the 1990s Enron had diversified from 
directly supplying electricity and gas into trading in them as commodities 
and later other commodities and derivatives. It collapsed in late 2001. 
 
The corporation was a large donor to both sides of US politics, but 
especially relevant were its large donations to George W Bush’s 
campaigns both in Texas and for the presidency. Waxman has 
documented major decisions made by the administration that reflected 
Enron’s preferred government policy or otherwise benefited Enron 
(Meek, 2002, TomPaine.comstaff, 2002). Lay, Enron’s head, clearly felt 
he could influence appointments by Bush. In May 2001, he attempted to 
use support for an agency head seeking a new appointment as a basis for 
having the agency change policy affecting Enron (reporter, 2001). 
 
A significant factor is the high level of interpersonal skills practiced by 
Lay. He was reputedly charming in personal dealings and had mounted a 
“charm offensive” with Clinton administration officials. When Enron 
collapsed he personally telephoned Bush officials, soliciting help 
(Gordon, 2002). 
 
As a legally incorporated company whose share stocks were traded 
publicly, Enron was subject to the Securities Act of 1933, administered 
by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Enron had to 
register its shares (“securities”) and file essential facts including:  
 
   a description of the company's properties and business 
   a description of the security to be offered for sale 
   information about the management of the company  
   financial statements certified by independent accountants  
(SEC, 2003) 
 
Although the SEC has extensive powers to investigate and deal with the 
activities of corporations whose securities are registered, “(a)t the heart of 
effective investor protection is an educated and careful investor” (SEC, 
2003). The entire government machinery was, or at least should be, 
merely “a service industry” according to the SEC Chairman (Pitt, 2001). 
This “service industry” receives huge numbers of filings that would be  
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practically impossible to fully review or monitor. The SEC sees the major 
purpose of filing as to inform the market (Hunt, 2001).  
 
Enron sent in large numbers of files – over 80 in 1999. Many were 
routine annual reports, but also included was a partnership arrangement 
between Enron and its Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow (Wall 
Street Journal, 2001). Analysts found great difficulty in unravelling and 
understanding the descriptions of financial arrangements revealed in the 
filings lodged by Enron (Steiger, 2002). The effect was to cause all but 
the most sceptical to revert to trust in the integrity and capacity of Enron 
personnel.  
 
The effect of the partnership arrangement was to remove liabilities from 
Enron’s reported financial results, artificially inflating its reported profit. 
For almost two years, that arrangement failed to attract the attention of 
the market (Wall Street Journal, 2001) – in this case the market in 
securities operating at stock exchanges. It appears to have been 
investigations by diligent Wall Street Journal writers that alerted the 
markets and ultimately regulatory authorities to these arrangements and to 
their significance. In September 2000, The Wall Street Journal carried a 
report first raising issues about Enron, but these were not followed up.  
 
However, in August 2001, Enron’s Chairman, Skilling, stepped down as 
CEO (Emshwiller, 2001). It seems that speculation over his reasons for 
doing so must have sparked the interest of Emshwiller and Smith, who 
began serious investigations. In mid-October they published three articles 
on successive days that exposed the nature and extent of Enron’s 
manipulation of financial arrangements. They showed that the 
arrangements concealed the true nature and extent of Enron’s assets and 
profitability (Emshwiller and Smith, 2001a, Emshwiller and Smith, 
2001b, Emshwiller and Smith, 2001c). 
 
Whilst many conclusions can be drawn from the actions which led to this 
point, the subsequent responses and actions are especially revealing. They 
reveal the nature, extent and effect of inter-relationships on the outcomes 
of this generally unexpected disturbance to the economic and social 
system. 
 
The Bush White House’s first public response was in answer to a 
question to Fleischer (Bush’s spokesman) on 28 November 2001, in 
which he merely said its situation was “being monitored by the Treasury 
Department” (Fleischer, 2001a, Fleischer, 2001b). In December, Bush 
responded to a question by saying there a was “a lot of government  
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inquiry into Enron and what took place” but made no commitment to 
Presidential intervention (Bush, 2001). His preferred position was that his 
agencies such as the SEC should handle matters arising. Chairman at the 
time was Pitt, a Bush appointee. Pitt’s values in relation to the role of 
government were reflected in speeches he made prior to the collapse of 
Enron. In these he very deliberately outlined a view that the role of 
government was that of a service industry
4,5. In the case of the SEC, it 
was seen as little more than a mail-house for the public posting of 
information provided by corporations. 
 
Bush’s first substantive response was announced following his meeting 
with his Economic Team in January 2002.  He announced he had asked 
his Secretaries of Treasury, Labor and Commerce to look into reforms to 
limit risks to life savings in cases such as corporate bankruptcy (Bush, 
2002). He eschewed opportunities to offer compensation or other special 
government assistance to those who had lost their life savings as 
employee contributors to Enron pension funds based on company shares. 
 
The Congress had several vehicles through which it could respond to the 
issues raised by Enron. One of the most powerful is the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), which has extensive powers to act on behalf 
of Congress similarly to auditors general.  
 
Moves by the GAO to obtain certain documents held by the 
administration were resisted by Bush, claiming that the GAO was acting 
beyond its authority and that to make them available would prejudice the 
“right of all future Presidents to receive advice without it being turned 
into a virtual news release” (Fleischer, 2002a). The nature of the alleged 
overstepping of authority was not explained, leaving open the suspicion 
that litigation against the GAO’s action amounted to a “stop writ”. 
 
Later, following a request from Congress, GAO convened a forum on 25 
February 2002, “on corporate governance, transparency, and 
accountability. Forum participants included individuals from federal and 
state government, the private sector, standards setting and oversight 
bodies, and a variety of other interested parties” (Walker, 2002). 
 
Eventually, large numbers of documents were made available to the 
Senate Government Affairs Committee in June - months later (Fleischer, 
2002b). 
 
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have committees to 
examine such matters. It is a feature of the US Congressional system that  
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committees function on highly partisan lines, down to chairs going to the 
majority party and the minority party having its own office. The 
Committee hearings and witnesses are listed in the Appendix. 
 
The Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs conducted 
an inquiry. On 21 March 2002 Pitt advised it that the SEC “Division of 
Enforcement (was) conducting a thorough investigation” (Pitt, 2002). 
However, no litigations were listed by the SEC up to 10 Feb 2003 (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2001-2003). 
  
Late in the year and long after the passage of the legislation, the Senate 
Government Affairs Committee (then chaired by Democrat Sen. 
Lieberman) issued its critical report “Financial Oversight of Enron: The 
SEC and Private –Sector Watchdogs” (U.S. Senate Government Affairs 
Committee, 2002). 
Business voice 
The Business Roundtable (the peak US business body) response is 
encapsulated in its prepared testimony to the House Financial Services 
Committee. The testimony supported the “inherently self-correcting 
nature of the market system” but went on to endorse many legislative 
proposals then before the House and ultimately adopted in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Significantly, it did not question the highly prescriptive rule 
based “black letter law” approach to some matters, such as limiting the 
proscription of certain activities to specified categories of personnel 
(Raines, 2002). Such a proscription would allow the undesirable activities 
to be executed by other personnel, perhaps under the authority or at the 
instigation of the specified personnel. 
Profession’s voice 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) was an active advocate of reform 
from at least 2000 (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2000) and provided 
testimony proposing reform (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2002b) 
and expert advice on the reconciliation of House of Representatives and 
Senate legislation in 2002 (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2002a). The 
IIA took a public stance critical of limited steps taken by the “Big Five” 
consulting firms to restrict activities which could lead to conflicts of 
interest (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2002c).  
5.  Principle-based v rule-based regulation 
A major difference claimed to exist between US regulatory approaches 
and some other jurisdictions such as Australia (& the UK) is the very  
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nature of regulation. The difference is exemplified by the regulation of 
auditor independence. The Australian approach is shown by the JPCAA 
recommendation that the Corporations Act provide: “The Auditor must be 
independent of the company in performing or exercising his or her 
functions or powers under this Act” (Joint Committee of Public Accounts 
and Audit, 2002). 
 
The UK is relying on professional self-regulation (Hewitt, 2003). 
 
The US Securities Exchange Act 1934 now has a long, detailed Section 
10A (g) running to 178 words, plus Section 10A (h) enabling certain 
exemptions (1934). 
 
Moore asserts the value of principle-based regulation but claims that 
regulation (in the US) is always likely to be more prescriptive. There are 
cultural reasons, such as the prevalence of lawyers in US society and the 
sheer scale of the country, which require a more formal approach than 
most (Moore, 2002).  
 
There may be other factors. One may be the very constitutional structure 
of an executive presidency. It may predispose towards prescriptive detail. 
The division of powers militates against cohesive political parties. One 
result is that individual congressmen and congresswomen seek to put 
their own imprint on legislation through amendments drafted and 
submitted to their House. The more incentive and opportunity for 
individual issues to be addressed by specific legislation, the less likely it 
is that that legislation will introduce a general principle to be observed by 
those to whom it applies. 
 
This also militates against legislation being structured to address a 
general purpose or objective, either by way of the long title (e.g. see 
Company Directors' Performance and Compensation Bill 2003 (UK)) or 
in a specific section, against which its particular provisions are then to be 
interpreted, as is standard practice in many other jurisdictions.   
 
An example of this effect can be seen in the very large number of 
legislative proposals that were introduced into Congress following the 
collapse of Enron and other problems of US corporate governance 
(Appendix 2 for those leading to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The Executive 
is in a weak position to provide leadership in the legislature’s legislative 
process. The consequence is extensive bargaining amongst members of 
Congress over specific matters to be incorporated in the final form of an 
act.   
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A second explanation may be that a culture of a particular legislative 
drafting style is very resistant to change. A legislature in which the 
membership generally and the political parties are weakly cohesive has a 
very limited capacity to review and challenge such a culture. 
 
A further factor is the strong, long-standing ideological tradition in the 
USA opposing intervention by the state in almost all spheres including 
corporate governance, reflected in Pitt’s assertion above that the role of 
government is as a service industry. This tradition stands in stark contrast 
to the history of an active role for government in jurisdictions such as the 
UK and Australia.  
 
It is noted that US rhetoric has not always been honoured in the form of 
an absence of regulation. Indeed Enron was a very active and successful 
lobbyist for regulatory decisions and public funding that favoured its 
business interests (Engler and Martinez, 2002). Nonetheless, the rhetoric 
appears to reflect an underlying ideological value. 
6.  Values  
The ideological values applied by the legislature and the administration 
underpin and drive the nature and extent of regulation applying to 
governance of the corporate sector. The assertion by one of Bush’s most 
senior appointees that government is a service industry and that his own 
agency’s role was primarily to provide a vehicle for information to be 
made available by corporations to investors (Pitt, 2001) was a revelation 
of an extraordinarily narrow ideological view of the role government 
executes on behalf of the citizens whose democratic authority it exercises.  
 
If different values were being applied, it is reasonable to assume 
correspondingly different policy prescriptions, legislative proposals and 
administrative practices would be pursued. 
7.  The complexity of regulation 
The cases of Enron and to a lesser extent HIH demonstrate a remarkable 
complexity in the factors affecting corporate governance within a 
jurisdiction. This examination has not considered the policy responses 
that have occurred at the levels of foreign and international actors in the 
public sector, corporate sector and civil society. 
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The three domestic sectors of governance are strongly interrelated. Each 
sector and actors within each sector have been influenced or more directly 
affected by the actions of other actors. Even the President as head of 
government and head of state has been affected in his actions by the 
actions of other actors. 
 






Interconnectedness refers to shared factors. Culture is one fundamental 
factor in interconnectedness, capable of both uniting and being the basis 
of division between peoples. Given the relative homogeneity of US 
culture, any role in this case may seem to be at most marginal. However, 
Hutton argues that current US Bush Administration ideology reflects a 
resurgent dominance by the values of the American South (Hutton, 2002). 
Thus US corporate governance policy may be influenced by cultural 
values that are not universally shared but notwithstanding are imposed 
generally through the operation of the system for the allocation of 
political power. Australia does not display great diversity in values 
affecting corporate governance.  
 
Underlying corporate governance in both Australia and the USA is an 
acceptance of the supremacy of the rule of law, the right of the legislature 
to legislate in the area. 
 
Although there were some severe reservations about the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act even before the final votes, the differences were not profound and it 
gained wide support (LaFALCE, 2002). Oxley has conceded that it 
“passed in almost a panic sort of situation” and may require review (Hill, 
2002). 
 
In this case it appears that there were profound differences between the 
values applied by senior personnel in certain corporations including HIH 
and Enron and those in most other corporations. These values extended to 
failures by certain actors to accept that the rule of law should determine 
their acts. However, there were also lawful acts that demonstrated a 
rejection of values such as fairness and equity. 
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These acts were subject to the jurisdiction of regulatory authorities, 
principally the ASIC, APRA and SEC. In the USA, the severely restricted 
role for government and the agency adopted and applied by the SEC 
prevailed regardless of any divergence between those values and views 
held by any other actors. This may be attributed to the status enjoyed by 
the SEC associated with the power which it exercised and the dominant 
ideology prevailing within the USA.  
 
Although other ideologies may be and are aired in the USA, they have not 
attracted levels of political support sufficient for them to be interpreted 
and applied. The structure of political power and the nature of political 
debate in Australia diminishes the possibility of one ideology prevailing, 
although there is not a great divergence between the major voices. 
Interdependence 
Interdependence refers to the extent to which institutions are dependent 
on each other, such as the dependence of the President or Executive 
Government on the appropriation of funds to carry out the functions of 
the various agencies of their offices. 
 
However, there are many interactions involving interdependence that are 
of profound relevance to corporate governance. 
  
Society has a fundamental interest in the production of goods and services 
and in the generation of employment and wealth. Whilst virtually all 
successful modern societies rely on corporate governance to address that 
interest, there is almost no production of goods or services that is not at 
least partly dependent on some aspect of public governance or civil 
society or both. 
 
In this case study, HIH was compromised of a small number of 
inter-related corporate entities whilst Enron was actually comprised of 
over 2000. These were incorporated under public laws subject to public 
governance. Those laws were themselves the product of a long history of 
interrelationships which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
none of these entities would not have been able to operate credibly if not 
incorporated.  
Stock Exchange 
As corporations which raised capital through the public issue of tradeable 
shares, HIH and Enron were heavily dependent on a secure trading 
environment. That environment was provided most immediately by stock  
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exchanges such as the Australian Stock Exchange and New York Stock 
Exchange.  
 
The NYSE operates under the regulatory authority of the SEC. Thus 
Enron was interdependent with stock exchanges on which they were 
listed, the SEC as the regulator, the analysts and others who informed and 
advised the market, the large institutional investors with their market 
power and the larger number of smaller investors. HIH was in a similar 
position. 
 
Both were dependent on legislated authority to provide their range of 
goods and services. Consumers of its energy products were dependent on 
Enron and competing suppliers for energy products. Contract law enabled 
the corporation to operate in a secure business environment and to 
recover its debts. Land title law creates security of tenure and, perhaps 
less important for large corporations, a capacity for debts to be secured.  
 
Various other laws added to the creation of a legal infrastructure that 
created specialist markets such as commodity and derivatives, or 
facilitated their operation. These markets helped satisfy social needs. 
Professional Standards 
Professional standards setting is generally the prerogative of voluntary 
associations of members of a profession. As such these associations are 
part of civil society, not subject to control by the public or private sector 
institutions, although usually formally incorporated under general 
legislative provisions. 
 
Professional standards setting in areas such as auditing serves a number 
of important purposes. It assists regulators in specifying reporting and 
other standards that would prove difficult for a bureaucracy to prepare 
and maintain. It greatly assists the market by enabling both the assurance 
of compliance with legislated requirements according to commonly 
accepted measures and also the comparison of the performance of 
different corporations. Professional standards setting thus sets up 
interdependence between the professional body,  corporations and the 
public sector. 
Money Politics 
Political donations establish a particular type of interdependence that 
reaches to the most critical decision-making areas. It has the potential to 
distort and corrupt decision-making away from the public interest to  
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favour the interests of those making substantial donations (Rich, 2002). 
Enron was an especially generous donor to a wide range of political 
actors, including to George W Bush over most of his political career. 
 
Political donations have a special significance in executive presidencies 
such as the USA. It is a feature of these that there is weak cohesion of 
political parties represented in the legislature. Individual politicians are 
much more dependent on attaining personal support both within 
legislative deliberations and within their constituencies than in mature 
parliamentary systems (e.g. UK, Australia, Canada). Within their 
constituencies they are heavily involved in personal fundraising rather 
than relying on fundraising by the party with which they are associated. 
Thus there are strong incentives towards attracting campaign funds from 
more generous sources. The wealthiest and potentially most generous 
sources are usually corporations. Corporations are subject to legislative 
decisions that may restrict or even advance the interests of the corporation 
or, more directly, those executives managing the corporation and deciding 
on donations. Those same corporate executives have an incentive to make 
donations, having regard to the most likely decisions of political 
candidates, based on the legislative voting record of incumbents and 
proclaimed policy positions.  
 
In mature parliamentary systems, strong party cohesion leads to collective 
decision-making on all major policy questions, insulating individual 
candidates, members of parliament and members of the political 
executive from direct influence by donors. Furthermore, in these systems 
political parties have a much stronger role in raising campaign funds, 
again largely isolating candidates from direct influence by donors. 
 
There is interdependence between corporations and political 
decision-makers created by political donations. Its potential to corrupt 
decision-making is high in the US presidential system. There is abundant 
evidence of attempts by Enron to seek favourable decisions from the 
public sector that, at the very least, coincided with lavish campaign 
donations. 
Interaction 
Interaction refers to the effects of one institution’s actions on the actions 
of one or more other institutions. Interactions are facilitated by 
interconnectedness. If values are not shared or cultural practices are 
inconsistent with each other, then interaction may be difficult, almost 
impossible or executed through means other than deliberation, e.g. 
violence.   
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In all regulatory matters, Enron as a corporation, the industry in which it 
operated and representative bodies such as The Business Roundtable, 
used their opportunity to influence the content and application of 
regulatory provisions.  
 
Their representations, those of civil society organisations and the 
receptiveness and response of the legislators, were all conditioned by 
their particular underlying social values. These will have been influenced 
by the social values held more generally in the community. It seems 
likely that the widespread support in testimony for limitations on non-
audit work being undertaken by a firm auditing the same corporation 
reflected a groundswell of opinion in support that had been lacking 
previously. 
 
As Waxman has demonstrated, Enron was successful in obtaining 
exemption from the application of certain regulations affecting its 
derivatives trading (TomPaine.comstaff, 2002). Such exemptions occur 
where the law is not rigidly prescriptive, but does allow some discretion 
to be exercised by officials. Key factors then become the specification of 
clear criteria to guide the exercise of such discretion and accountability 
for each decision made. 
 
The integrity and efficiency of the administration of justice is a further 
factor affecting the operation of governance. The administration of justice 
is a major mechanism for mediating apparent or actual conflicts between 
public governance and corporate governance, such as the prosecution of 
breaches of rules established by the public sector. No evidence has been 
found to date of a failure of that to operate satisfactorily in respect of 
Enron. However, there are extremely grave concerns about the operation 
of the highest judicial forums in the USA, with perceptions that partisan 
factors influenced key decisions affecting the election of George W Bush 
as President. 
Machine or Normative Model? 
However, the very form of the law that is interpreted and applied is 
crucial. If the law is narrowly defined prescriptive, rule based “black 
letter” law, then the public policy objectives of the legislators may be 
subverted by skilful circumvention of the precise provisions of the law. 
The interactions are affected by the manner in which rules are framed. 
Principle bases laws clearly indicate the objective of the rules to those 
bound by them, providing incentives to conform to the objectives. Rule 
based law merely prescribes particular actions that may or may not be  
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undertaken, sometimes even confining its application to particular 
categories of actors.  
 
If rule based, the system’s functioning is likely to closely resemble 
Mintzberg’s Government as Machine Model, with all the limitations he 
describes; if principle based, then it will be closer to his Normative-
Control Model (Mintzberg, 1996). 
Rational fools 
Another form of interaction affecting the governance of society is capital 
raising by corporations via share issues. There is an underlying 
assumption of the rational actor, yet examples abound where investors 
operating in the stock market have not acted in accordance with rational 
analysis of either individual corporations or the stock market in general or 
with reasonable assessments of overall economic conditions. Investors 
have been seen acting in accordance with a herd mentality. “Rational 
fools” in Sen’s terminology (Sen, 2002). 
 
In Enron’s case, the interactions between corporations and investors were 
severely inhibited by the complexity of the corporate structures and their 
financial inter-relationships. Extensive information in filings was 
available through the SEC as the public source whose legislated and 
self-proclaimed function was to do so. The problem was not one of 
transparency as suggested in Rich’s analysis (Rich, 2002).  
 
In fact, the effectiveness of the interactions was compromised by human 
limitations –the capacity to assimilate, process and analyse the data. Thus, 
the best intentions of the legislators and no doubt the administrators as 
expressed in comprehensive formal rules did not, and it is argued, could 
not ensure the adequacy of the fuzzy logic processes through which 
affected human actors to come to decisions and act.  
 
Accountability is the underlying issue at stake in many of these aspects of 
interaction. Included is:  
 
  the accountability to citizens for the exercise of their democratic 
authority by the legislature and the executive;  
  the accountability of corporations to existing shareholders, to 
potential investors to whom shares are on offer through stock 
exchanges;  
  the accountability of corporations to their other stakeholders;   
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  the accountability of auditors to stakeholders beyond their own 
firms; and,  
  the accountability of professional associations and standards setters 
for the roles they play in their privileged positions with respect to 
the public interest. 
 
Where the GAO or any other accountability agent is blocked in the 
discharge of their responsibilities, or the media is unable or unwilling to 
report, flows of information are distorted and decision-making within the 
system can be corrupted. 
 
A final consideration on interactions is to note the effect of time. Enron’s 
labyrinthine financial structures were not understood publicly until almost 
two years after the filing of the key information with the SEC. It seems a 
trigger (in this case, Skilling’s resignation) was the “tipping point” 
necessary to precipitate the investigation that led to the analysis and 
revelation. The information produced an avalanche effect, first on the 
stock market, but spreading to other aspects of Enron, to other 
corporations, and to judicial, legislative and administrative responses, 
some of which are still underway. More rapid responses would likely 
have led to less well-considered adaptation of law and administration. 
Slower responses would have facilitated even stronger resistance by 
actors sensing disadvantages to their interests from reform as with earlier 
attempts to address some problems highlighted by Enron. 
8.  Complex evolving system 
What we see here is highly complex interplay of actors and factors. The 
actors – some functioning in aggregate as institutional actors (e.g. 
Congress) – are inter-related at a number of levels. How they inter-relate 
depends on factors ranging from formal rules to the most subtle 
interpretation and practice of values and ethics. They are bound by shared 
factors that interconnect them, there are degrees of interdependence and 
they are affected by their interactions with other actors. 
 
The socio-political system described in this instance has the 
characteristics of a complex evolving system. It is a complex adaptive 
system, “able to adapt and change within, or as part of, a changing 
environment” (Mitleton-Kelly, 1998) of the particular type with the 
distinguishing features of human language that facilitates learning and the 
capacity of humans to design changes to the system itself (Centre for 
Information and Organisation Studies). 
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However, it would be mistaken to think that a social system is capable of 
being modelled to the extent that a precise model of its structures and 
rules could be constructed and changes tested to assess their effectiveness 
in avoiding the types of behaviours observed in this case study. The fact 
of the capacity of the many human and institutional actors to act 
independently and unpredictably and to defy both rational choice theory 
and binding rules renders such modelling unreliable. Not only would it be 
unreliable but also it would be potentially extremely dangerous in that 
re-design based on the model could produce catastrophic unintended 
outcomes.  
 
However, even that analysis assumes that it would be possible to design 
and construct such a model. Stewart (2002) has drawn attention to the 
incalculability of the huge number of variables involved in such 
modelling (Stewart, 2002). 
 
Thus whilst the complex evolving system is a useful metaphor, it has 
limited usefulness in helping us understand just how governance is 
actually operating. Habermas suggests that system effects can come into 
conflict with and undermine what he describes as “lifeworld” – the 
ordinary aspects of life which are outside the realm of public and 
corporate governance and even the formal aspects of civil society. 
“Culture and personality come under attack for the sake of warding off 
crises and stabilising society” (Habermas, 1996)(317), as seen in 
responses by the socio-political system to Enron, in which victims were 
left to the mercy of the market and highly prescriptive rules were imposed 
on certain corporate sector actors. 
9.  Communicative Action 
Habermas has proposed a theory of communicative action to describe the 
governance of societies. This relies on conception of rationality that is 
communicative, “grounded in interactions between human subjects” 
(Outhwaite, 1996)(15). It is summed up by: 
 
In modern societies there is such an expansion of the scope of 
contingency for interaction loosed from normative contexts that the inner 
logic of communicative action “becomes practically true” in the 
deinstitutionalized forms of intercourse of the familial private sphere as 
well as in a public sphere stamped by the mass media. At the same time, 
the systemic imperatives of autonomous subsystems penetrate into the 
lifeworld and, through monetarization and bureaucratisation, force an 
assimilation of communicative action to formally organized domains of  
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action – even in areas where the action-coordinating mechanism of 
reaching understanding is functionally necessary (Habermas, 1996)334). 
 
The case of Enron provides support for this approach. The events leading 
up to the collapse and bankruptcy of Enron were very much expressions 
of the operation of communicative action. The events cannot be explained 
by the nature of the structures and rules affecting governance. They were 
a product of communications, or more precisely, failures of 
communications to address and redress actions intended to deceive 
investors and others for the purposes of personal greed.  
 
The events and actions which followed were clear illustrations of 
communicative actions, although the interests or involvement of those 
whose lifeworlds were most affected are noticeably absent. Nonetheless, 
the measures taken arose through iterative processes of communicative 
action involving a large range of mostly institutional actors. 
10.  Fuzzy logic 
What emerges is a picture of communicative actions that are highly 
variable in their nature, functioning and effects. Some actions such as 
legislative deliberations occur according to highly structured, formulaic 
rules, but many such as the “behind the scenes” development of 
legislation involve much more complex and subtle processes. We see that 
such matters as the availability, selection and interpretation of 
information, assessments, estimation, judgment, values, trust, negotiation 
and bargaining affect actions. These types of processes for dealing with 
complex information are analogous with fuzzy logic (1). Fuzzy logic is 
used here as metaphor (Mesjasz, 2001). 
 
Fuzzy logic is proposed as the term can be used to encapsulate a range of 
processes involving the handling of approximate information and 
uncertainty. It is also a term that implies a lack of precision in processes 
that do produce outcomes accepted as logical.  
 
The collapse of Enron is more clearly understood if the events are 
recognised as the product of communicative action that involved high 
levels of complexity and operated according to fuzzy logic. There was no 
pattern of rational behaviour conforming to some model of the behaviour 
of individual and institutional actors.  
 
Individuals within Enron and its advisers, principally Arthur Anderson, 
selected and interpreted financial structural and reporting options in ways  
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that were unintended, unexpected and possibly illegal. The 
Administration and its SEC applied neo-liberal values to their 
responsibilities in an extraordinarily minimalist way, facilitating Enron’s 
actions. Market analysts and the market placed trust in Enron in their 
interpretation of filings with the SEC. Only the inquisitive actions of two 
Wall Street Journal investigators, unwilling to accept Enron’s information 
at face value, led to the publication of analysis that caused a dramatic 
reassessment by the market. Only then was Enron’s political influence 
checked. 
 
Many of the processes involved in the aftermath of the Enron case 
similarly involved actors in a range of processes in which there were not 
clear rules and it was not possible to use formulae to determine the 
optimum measures to achieve desired outcomes in corporate governance.  
The processes were fuzzy but they did achieve outcomes that were 
broadly accepted as an appropriate way of creating a quick response to a 
generally unexpected disturbance to the economic and social system. 
 
However, there are also serious reservations about the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. These relate to some differences over which matters it addressed and 
the manner in which they were handled. The matters included were 
inevitably determined by political judgments both as to the most urgent 
issues and as to how wide-ranging it was practical for an individual 
statute to be. The strong competition for the limited time available to 
members of Congress, Administration officials and their advisers was 
certain to have been a factor. Again, there is no simple, or complex, 
formula by which to compute such a decision. 
 
The manner in which the Act dealt with matters relates to such issues as 
principle-based versus rule-based regulation. In that case, the established 
custom of rule-based regulation seems not to have been challenged. This 
was another case where practice was adopted for reasons that did not 
reflect comprehensive or rational analysis. 
 
There were also some amendments that proposed the creation of highly 
interventionist agencies. Their rejection may be a reflection of prevailing 
neo-liberal values; there is little sign in the Congressional Record that it 
was evidence-based policy making. 
 
A related issue is the manner of processing the legislation through 
Congress. Although there were Committee Hearings at which expert 
witnesses and representatives of peak bodies gave testimony, the manner 
in which their advice and the deliberations of the committees contributed  
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to the final form of the legislation is unclear. They undoubtedly did 
contribute, but the details are fuzzy. Once the final debate occurred, it 
was highly orchestrated, with little fuzziness and heavy reliance on the 
capacity of Congressional leaders to assemble coalitions of support for 
key contested provisions. 
11.  Conclusion 
The paper suggests that viewing the relationship between public 
management as regulators, corporations and others in this way will assist 
understanding the role of unanticipated events and the management of 
responses and adaptation to uncertainty in a society’s internal and 
external environments. In particular, it has shown how governance can 
join up, in a different sense to the “joined up” government of the Blair 
Labour Party UK Government.  
 
In this case, the three major aspects of socio-political governance each 
joined to play a significant role in addressing an issue with major 
economic and social implications. Their roles were not separate. Each 
interacted with the other two and the effectiveness of those 
inter-relationships was crucial to the outcome. These inter-relationships 
operated similarly to Habermas’ communicative action, but they can also 
be better understood if seen as occurring according to fuzzy logic. 
 
Improved understandings of these inter-relationships between governance 
sectors could assist public management in working with the corporate 





Appendix 1.   
Witnesses to US Congressional Committee Hearings (2002) following 
the collapse of Enron Corporation 
 
House of Representatives Committee on 
Financial Services 
Hearings on H.R. 3763, the Corporate and 
Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, 
and Transparency Act of 2002 
Wednesday, March 13, 2002 
Wednesday, March 20, 2002 
Tuesday, April 09, 2002 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs 
Hearings on Accounting and Investor Protection 
Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: 
Oversight of the Accounting Profession, Audit Quality 
and Independence, and Formulation of Accounting 
Principles. 
Tuesday 12 February 2002 
Thursday 14 February 2002 
Tuesday 26 February 2002 
Tuesday 5 March 2002 
Wednesday 6 March 2002 
Thursday 14 March 2002 
Tuesday 19 March 2002 
Wednesday 20 March 2002 
Thursday 21 March 2002 
Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities 
Industry Association 
The Honorable Roderick M. Hills 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission  
1975-77  
Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 
The Honorable Harold M. Williams 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission  
1977-81 
James Glassman, Resident Fellow, 
American Enterprise Institute 
The Honorable David Ruder  
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission  
1987-89 
Ted White, Director of Corporate 
Governance, California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System 
The Honorable Richard C. Breeden 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission  
1989-93 
Roderick M. Hills, Former Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
The Honorable Arthur Levitt, Jr. 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission  
1993-2000 
Barbara Roper, Director of Investor 
Protection, Consumer Federation of 
America 
The Honorable Paul Volcker 
Chairman of the Trustees of the International 
Accounting Standards Board; 
Chairman of Arthur Andersen's Independent 
Oversight Board; and 
Former Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System  
Lynn Turner, Director, Center for Quality 
Financial Reporting 
Mr. Walter P. Schuetze  
Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange 
Commission 1992-95  
The Honorable Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, 
U. S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
Mr. Michael H. Sutton 
Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange 
Commission1995-98 
Mr. Franklin D. Raines, Chairman and 
CEO, Fannie Mae, on behalf of The 
Business Roundtable 
Mr. Lynn E. Turner 




Mr. H. Carl McCall, Comptroller, State of 
New York, Office of the State 
Comptroller 
Mr. Dennis R. Beresford 
Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards 
Board1987-97 
Mr. Joseph V. DelRaso, Partner, Pepper 
Hamilton, LLP 
Sir David Tweedie 
Chairman of the International Accounting Standards 
Board; and 
Former Chairman of the United Kingdom's 
Accounting Standards Board 
Mr. Philip B. Livingston, President and 
CEO, Financial Executives International 
Mr. David M. Walker 
Comptroller General of the United States General 
Accounting Office 
Mr. Jerry J. Jasinowski, President, 
National Association of Manufacturers 
 Professor Joel Seligman 
Dean and Ethan A.H. Shepley University Professor 
Washington University School of Law 
Mr. Peter C. Chapman, Senior Vice 
President and Chief Counsel, Corporate 
Governance, TIAA-CREF 
Mr. Robert Glauber 
Chairman & CEO 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc 
The Honorable Peter R. Fisher, Under 
Secretary for Domestic Finance, 
Department of the Treasury (submitted 
for the record) 
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. 
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law 
Columbia University School of Law School 
David Walker, Comptroller General of the 
United States, U.S. General Accounting 
Office 
Mr. Shaun O'Malley 
Chair of the 2000 Public Oversight Board Panel on 
Audit Effectiveness (O'Malley Commission) 
 and Former Chair, Price Waterhouse LLP  
Richard C. Breeden, Former Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Richard C. Breeden & Co. 
Mr. Lee Seidler 
Deputy Chairman of the 1978 AICPA Commission on 
Auditor's Responsibilities, and Managing Director 
Emeritus, Bear Stearns & Co. 
Donald C. Langevoort, Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Mr. Arthur R. Wyatt 
Past President 
American Accounting Association 
Former partner, Arthur Andersen & Co. 
and Professor of Accountancy Emeritus 
University of Illinois 
Damon Silvers, Associate General 
Counsel, AFL-CIO  
Professor Abraham Briloff 
Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Professor Emeritus, 
Baruch College 
City University of New York 
 Mr.  Bevis  Longstreth 
Member of the O'Malley Commission 
Member of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(1981-1984) 
and retired partner, Debvoise & Plimpton.  
  Mr. James G. Castellano, CPA 
Chairman, Board of Directors 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) 
Managing Partner, Rubin, Brown, Gornstein Co., LLP 
  Mr. James S. Gerson, CPA 
Chairman, Auditing Standards Board, AICPA 
Partner, National Office of PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
LLP  
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  Mr. William E. Balhoff, CPA, CFE 
Chairman, Executive Committee 
AICPA Public Company Practice Section 
Senior Audit Director 
Postlethwaite & Netterville, A.P.A.C. 
  Ms. Olivia F. Kirtley, CPA 
Former Chair, Board of Directors 
AICPA (1998-99) 
Retired Vice President and CFO 
Vermont American Company 
  Mr. James E. Copeland, Jr., CPA 
Chief Executive Officer 
Deloitte & Touche 
  Mr. Robert E. Litan 
Director, Economic Studies Program 
The Brookings Institution 
 Mr.  Peter  J.  Wallison 
Resident Fellow and Co-Director 
Financial Deregulation Project 
American Enterprise Institute 
  Mr. Charles A. Bowsher 
Chairman 
Public Oversight Board  
Former Comptroller General of the United States 
  Ms. Aulana L. Peters 
Member 
Public Oversight Board 
  Mr. L. William Seidman 
Former Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
and Resolution Trust Corporation 
  Mr. John C. Whitehead 
Former Co-Chairman of Goldman Sachs & Co. 
Former Deputy Secretary of State 
  Mr. Michael Mayo 
Managing Director 
Prudential Securities, Inc. 
Head of Financial Services Research Group 
  The Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum 
 Chairman 
 Consumer Federation of America 
 Former U.S. Senator  
 Mr.  Damon  Silvers 
Associate General Counsel 
AFL-CIO 
 Ms.  Sarah  Teslik 
Executive Director 
Council of Institutional Investors 
  Mr. Thomas A. Bowman 
President and CEO 
Association for Investment Management and Research 
  The Honorable Harvey L. Pitt 
Chairman 
Securities and Exchange Commission  
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Sources: U.S. House of Representatives Committee of Financial Services. Available at: 
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=printed&congress=8  
Accessed 11 March 2003; U.S. House of Senate Committee of Banking Housing and Urban 
Affairs. Available at: http://banking.senate.gov/hrg02.htm Accessed 11 March 2003  
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Appendix 2.   
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – related bills and amendments 
Versions 
There were 6 versions of the Bill, Number H.R.3763 for the 107th 
Congress 
 
1. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)[H.R.3763.EAS] 
2. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparency Act of 2002 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by 
House)[H.R.3763.EH] 
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both 
House and Senate)[H.R.3763.ENR] 
4. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparency Act of 2002 (Introduced in House)[H.R.3763.IH] 
5. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparency Act of 2002 (Referred to Senate Committee after being 
Received from House)[H.R.3763.RFS] 
6. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparency Act of 2002 (Reported in House)[H.R.3763.RH] 
Related bills 
H.R.5070  
Title: To improve quality and transparency in financial reporting and 
independent audits and accounting services for public companies, to 
create a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to enhance the 
standard setting process for accounting practices, to strengthen the 
independence of firms that audit public companies, to increase corporate 
responsibility and the usefulness of corporate financial disclosure, to 
protect the objectivity and independence of securities analysts, to improve 
Securities and Exchange Commission resources and oversight, and for 
other purposes.   
 




Title: To provide for enhanced penalties for accounting and auditing 
improprieties at publicly traded companies, and for other purposes.  
 
Sponsor: Rep Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. [WI-9] (introduced 7/15/2002) 
S.2673  
Title: An original bill to improve quality and transparency in financial 
reporting and independent audits and accounting services for public 
companies, to create a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to 
enhance the standard setting process for accounting practices, to 
strengthen the independence of firms that audit public companies, to 
increase corporate responsibility and the usefulness of corporate financial 
disclosure, to protect the objectivity and independence of securities 
analysts, to improve Securities and Exchange Commission resources and 
oversight, and for other purposes.  
 
Sponsor: Sen Sarbanes, Paul S. [MD] (introduced 6/25/2002) 
Amendments 
House of Representatives 
H.AMDT.454 (A001) 4/24/2002 
    Amendment (A001) offered by Mr. Oxley. (consideration: CR H1563-
1564; text: CR H1563) 
Amendment clarifies language contained in the bill to make various 
technical and conforming changes; to strike provisions requiring 
companies listed on the stock exchanges to a code of ethics for senior 
corporate officers due to workability issues; and to retain provisions 
regarding disclosure of changes in issuer codes of conduct.  
 
H.AMDT.455 (A002) 4/24/2002 
     Amends:  H.R.3763  Amendment (A002) offered by Mr. Capuano. 
(consideration: CR H1564-1565; text: CR H1564) 
Amendment provides that at least one member of the five-member public 
regulatory organization (PRO) established under the bill be a person who 
has never been licensed to practice public accounting and clarifies that 
two members of the public regulatory organization (PRO) must be 
individuals licensed to practice public accounting, two members may be 
individuals licensed to practice public accounting if they have not 
practiced within two years of being appointed, and one member must not  
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be licensed to practice public accounting. The amendment also specifies 
that all members of the PRO board must meet a standard of financial 
literacy as determined by the SEC.  
 
H.AMDT.456 (A003) 4/24/2002 
     Amendment  (A003)  offered  by Mr. Sherman. (consideration: CR 
H1565-1567; text: CR H1565)           
Amendment sought to establish capital standards for accounting 
companies that audit publicly traded companies; and require the SEC to 
set capital standards at a level no lower than half of the firm's annual 
audit revenues. It would require auditors of publicly-traded companies to 
meet a minimum net capital requirement of not less than one-half of the 
annual audit revenue received by the accountant from issuers registered 
with the SEC.  
 
H.AMDT.457 (A004) 4/24/2002 
     Substitute  amendment  in  the  nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
Kucinich. (consideration: CR H1567-1574; text: CR H1567-1568)           
Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to create the Federal 
Bureau of Audits to conduct an annual audit of the financial statements 
that are required to be submitted by reporting issuers and to be certified 
under the securities laws, rules or regulations. It would create the Federal 
Bureau of Audits (FBA) to monitor corporate America's books by 
auditing all publicly-traded companies. The new agency would be a part 
of the SEC, but would maintain appropriate independence. The SEC 
would set the basic rules of auditing by incorporating the generally 
accepted auditing standards rules and making further refinements that are 
"necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors." The FBA's integrity will be ensured by several conflict of 
interest provisions designed to make certain that American taxpayers, 
investors, and employees get an accurate assessment of a corporation.  
 
H.AMDT.458 (A005) 4/24/2002  
     Amendment  (A005)  offered  by Mr. LaFalce. (consideration: CR 
H1574-1589; text: CR H1574-1583) 
Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to provide for the creation 
of a Public Regulatory Organization, define the nature and composition of 
the organization, and delineate its specific roles and responsibilities. It 
would replace the regulatory structure in the bill with one that requires 
establishment of a public regulator with specified duties and authority; to 
modify definitions of non-audit services to make the two bans on 
non-audit services included in the bill effective; to provide for approval of 
non-audit services by the audit committee; to replace the executive  
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responsibility provisions in the bill to require executive certification of 
financial statements; to improve the ability of the SEC to bar officers and 
directors from future service in public companies; to enable the SEC to 
obtain disgorgement of stock bonuses from executives who have falsified 
financial statements; to place limits on analyst conflicts of interest and 
improve corporate governance by giving audit committees oversight of 
auditors; and to establish an independent nominating committee for 
independent directors.            
Senate 
S.AMDT.4173 7/8/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4173 proposed by Senator Sarbanes. (consideration: 
CR S6340; text: CR S6340)  
To make technical and conforming amendments.  
 
S.AMDT.4174 7/9/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4174 proposed by Senator Daschle for Senator Leahy. 
(consideration: CR S6436-6438)  
To provide for criminal prosecution of persons who alter or destroy 
evidence in certain Federal investigations or defraud investors of publicly 
traded securities, and for other purposes.  
 
S.AMDT.4175 7/9/2002: 
     Amendment  SA  4175  proposed by Senator Gramm for Senator 
McConnell to Amendment SA 4174. (consideration: CR S6438-6443, 
S6491-6496; text: CR S6438-6439)  
To provide for certification of financial reports by labor organizations and 
to improve quality and transparency in financial reporting and 
independent audits and accounting services for labor organizations.  
 
S.AMDT.4176 7/9/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4176 proposed by Senator Miller. (consideration: CR 
S6443-6444, S6491; text: CR S6443)  
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to require the signing of 
corporate tax returns by the chief executive officer of the corporation.  
 
S.AMDT.4184 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4184 proposed by Senator Gramm to Amendment SA 
4174 Division I. (consideration: CR S6537-6538; text: CR S6538)  
To provide the Board with appropriate flexibility in applying non-audit 





     Amendment SA 4185 proposed by Senator Daschle for Senator Leahy. 
(consideration: CR S6538-6541)  
To provide for criminal prosecution of persons who alter or destroy 
evidence in certain Federal investigations or defraud investors of publicly 
traded securities, and for other purposes.  
 
S.AMDT.4186 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4186 proposed by Senator Daschle for Senator Biden. 
(consideration: CR S6541-6542; text: CR S6541-6542)  
To increase criminal penalties relating to conspiracy, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and certain ERISA violations, and for other purposes. 
 
S.AMDT.4187 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4187 proposed by Senator Edwards. (consideration: 
CR S6551-6552, S6559; text: CR S6552; text as modified: CR S6559)  
To address rules of professional responsibility for attorneys.  
There were eight amendments to this amendment: S.AMDT.4200, 
S.AMDT.4283, S.AMDT.4284, S.AMDT.4286, S.AMDT.4289, 
S.AMDT.4290, S.AMDT.4291, S.AMDT.4292 
 
S.AMDT.4188 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4188 proposed by Senator Lott. (consideration: CR 
S6542-6543, S6545, S6549-6551; text: CR S6542-6543)  
To deter fraud and abuse by corporate executives.  
 
S.AMDT.4189 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4189 proposed by Senator Gramm to Amendment SA 
4188. (consideration: CR S6543, S6548; text: CR S6543)  
To deter fraud and abuse by corporate executives.  
 
S.AMDT.4190 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4190 proposed by Senator Daschle for Senator Biden 
to Amendment SA 4186. (consideration: CR S6544-6545, S6547-6548; 
text: CR S6544-6545; text as modified: CR S6547-6548)  
To increase criminal penalties relating to conspiracy, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and certain ERISA violations, and for other purposes.  
 
S.AMDT.4200 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment  SA  4200  proposed by Senator Gramm for Senator 
McConnell to Amendment SA 4187. (consideration: CR S6552-6557)  
To modify attorney practices relating to clients, and for other purposes.   
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S.AMDT.4206 7/10/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4206 proposed by Senator Miller. (consideration: CR 
S6557; text: CR S6557)  
To express the sense of the Senate that the chief executive officer of a 
corporation should sign the corporation's income tax returns.  
 
S.AMDT. 4215 7/12/2002: 
     Amendment  S.AMDT.  4215  proposed  by  Senator  Dorgan. 
(consideration: CR S6688-6689) 
To clarify that the requirement that certain officers certify financial 
reports applies to domestic foreign issuers. 
 
S.AMDT.4269 7/11/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4269 proposed by Senator Daschle for Senator Levin. 
(consideration: CR S6620-6625, S6636-6643)  
To address procedures for banning certain individuals from serving ax 
officers or directors of publicly traded companies, civil money penalties, 
obtaining financial records, broadened enforcement authority, and 
forfeiture of bonuses and profits.  
 
S.AMDT.4270 7/11/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4270 proposed by Senator McCain. (consideration: 
CR S6625; text: CR S6625)  
To require publicly traded companies to record and treat stock options as 
expenses when granted for purposes of their income statements.  
 
S.AMDT.4271 7/11/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4271 proposed by Senator Reid for Senator Edwards 
to the instructions of the Motion to Recommit.. (consideration: CR 
S6625; text: CR S6625)  
To address rules of professional responsibility for attorneys.  
 
S.AMDT.4272 7/11/2002: 
     Amendment SA 4272 proposed by Senator Reid for Senator Levin to 
Amendment SA 4271. (consideration: CR S6625)  
To address procedures for banning certain individuals from serving as 
officers or directors of publicly traded companies, civil money penalties, 
obtaining financial records, broadened enforcement authority, and 
forfeiture of bonuses and profits.  
 
S.AMDT.4295 7/12/2002: 
    Amendment SA 4295 proposed by Senator Schumer. (consideration: 
CR S6689-6690; text: CR S6690)  
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To enhance conflict of interest provisions by prohibiting personal loans 
by issuers to chief officers of the issuer.  
 
S.AMDT.4296 7/12/2002: 
    Amendment SA 4296 proposed by Senator Schumer. (consideration: 
CR S6690-6691; text: CR S6690) 
To require a study of the accounting treatment of special purpose entities.  
 
Sources:  U.S. Congressional Record.  Available at:  
http://thomas.loc.gov/i107/i107CONSUMER.html  
Accessed 11 March 2003 
 
      
           
 




1    Fuzzy logic is shorthand for a family of related theories arising from 
pioneering work by Zadeh.  It is summarised in the brief outline which 
follows: 
What is Fuzzy Logic? 
Many decision-making and problem-solving tasks are too complex to be 
understood quantitatively, however, people succeed by using knowledge 
that is imprecise rather than precise. Fuzzy set theory, originally introduced 
by Lotfi Zadeh in the 1960's, resembles human reasoning in its use of 
approximate information and uncertainty to generate decisions. It was 
specifically designed to mathematically represent uncertainty and 
vagueness and provide formalized tools for dealing with the imprecision 
intrinsic to many problems. By contrast, traditional computing demands 
precision down to each bit. Since knowledge can be expressed more 
naturally by using fuzzy sets, many engineering and decision problems can 
be greatly simplified. 
 
Fuzzy set theory implements classes or groupings of data with boundaries 
that are not sharply defined (i.e. fuzzy). Any methodology or theory 
implementing "crisp" definitions such as classical set theory, arithmetic, 
and programming, may be "fuzzified" by generalizing the concept of a 
crisp set to a fuzzy set with blurred boundaries. The benefit of extending 
crisp theory and analysis methods to fuzzy techniques is the strength in 
solving real-world problems, which inevitably entail some degree of 
imprecision and noise in the variables and parameters measured and 
processed for the application. Accordingly, linguistic variables are a critical 
aspect of some fuzzy logic applications, where general terms such a 
"large," "medium," and "small" are each used to capture a range of 
numerical values. While similar to conventional quantization, fuzzy logic 
allows these stratified sets to overlap (e.g. an 85 kilogram man may be 
classified in both the "large" and "medium" categories, with varying 
degrees of belonging or membership to each group). Fuzzy set theory 
encompasses fuzzy logic, fuzzy arithmetic, fuzzy mathematical 
programming, fuzzy topology, fuzzy graph theory, and fuzzy data analysis, 
though the term fuzzy logic is often used to describe all of these. 
 
Fuzzy logic emerged into the mainstream of information technology in the 
late 1980's and early 1990's. Fuzzy logic is a departure from classical  
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Boolean logic in that it implements soft linguistic variables on a continuous 
range of truth values which allows intermediate values to be defined 
between conventional binary. It can often be considered a superset of 
Boolean or "crisp logic" in the way fuzzy set theory is a superset of 
conventional set theory. Since fuzzy logic can handle approximate 
information in a systematic way, it is ideal for controlling non-linear 
systems and for modeling complex systems where an inexact model exists 
or systems where ambiguity or vagueness is common. A typical fuzzy 
system consists of a rule base, membership functions, and an inference 
procedure. Today, fuzzy logic is found in a variety of control applications 
including chemical process control, manufacturing, and in such consumer 
products as washing machines, video cameras, and automobiles. 
 
© Copyright 1997 Battelle Memorial Institute 
URL:  http://www.emsl.pnl.gov:2080/proj/neuron/fuzzy/what.html  
accessed 13 January 2000 
 
2    Enron Corporation was undergoing bankruptcy proceedings related to 
reorganising the company’s structure and operations at the time of writing 
– see < http://www.elaw4enron.com/default.asp> accessed 16 May 2003 
 
3   Formally, royal commissions are appointed by and report to the Governor 
General as the representative of the head of state, the Queen; in practice, 
the executive government makes all relevant decisions, including the terms 
of reference and the definition of the wide-ranging powers of inquiry 
available under the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Australia).  
 
4    The same terminology was used in 2001 by another Bush appointee, 
Federal Communications Commissioner Abernathy 
<http://www.entelec.org/p.php3?wr=fall2001> 19 February 2003 
 
5   Pilon has argued that “Modern Democrats, and many Republicans as well, 
have come to view government as a service industry, with citizens as its 
customers… That is a far cry from the Founders' conception of limited 
government. And it is fundamentally inconsistent with the Constitution.” 
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